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THE ALLEGED DEPENDENCY OF THE 
COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT ON 
THE ONTOLOGICAL 
J. William Forgie 
In a recent issue of Faith and Philosophy, William Vallicella maintains that the 
cosmological argument (CA) depends on the ontological argument (OA), not 
on an OA "from mere concepts", as Kant wrongly supposed, but on a modal 
OA "from possibility". He argues (1) that the CA "presupposes" that God (or 
the ens realissum) is possible, and therefore (2) that the CA depends on the OA 
in a way that renders the CA superfluous. I suggest that although (1) is unde-
niably true, the notion of presupposition Vallicella uses is insufficiently epis-
temic to allow his inference from (1) to (2). 
In a recent issue of Faith and Philosophy, William Vallicella considers Kant's 
contention that the cosmological argument (CA) depends for its cogency on 
the ontological argument (OA).l He distinguishes two kinds of ontological 
argument, one "from mere concepts" and one "from possibility". He gener-
ously cites, and expresses agreement with, my own view that Kant fails to 
show that the CA depends on the OA from mere concepts.2 However, he 
believes the CA does depend (a dependency Kant did not consider) on the 
OA from possibility. I am not persuaded by this latter claim. 
Some brief background. Kant considers cosmological arguments that 
proceed in two stages. In the first stage one argues from the existence of 
anything at all to the existence of a necessary being. In the second stage one 
argues from the existence of a necessary being to the existence of God, or a 
supreme being, or - to employ Kant's idiom - an ens realissimum. Kant 
maintains that in this second stage of the CA the cosmological arguer 
makes claims which entail: 
Every ens realissimum is a necessary being; 
He thinks this in tum entails: 
From the mere concept of an ens realissimum the necessary existence 
of its object can be inferred. 
Kant claims that (b) is precisely what the ontological argument maintains. 
And it is because of this commitment to (b) that Kant concludes that the 
cogency of the CA depends on that of the OA. Thus the CA, and its pre-
tensions to offer a proof of God based on experience, is superfluous. 
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I believe Kant's dependency argument can be resisted by distinguishing 
between a proposition's being necessarily true on the one hand and our 
being able to establish a priori that it is true on the other. We can then 
resist Kant's claim that (a) entails (b). The details of this position are 
worked out in the paper referred to earlier. 
Vallicella concedes this criticism of Kant, and he agrees that Kant has 
failed to show that the CA depends on the OA from mere concepts. But he 
believes a new dependency argument can be developed, one which reveals 
that the CA depends on the OA from possibility. By an OA "from possibil-
ity" Vallicella has in mind an argument that proceeds as follows: 
God (the ens realissimum) is possible; 
Either God is impossible or God necessarily exists; 
Therefore, God necessarily exists. 
Let us suppose that God, or the ens realissimum, is understood in such a 
way that the second premise of this argument is true - as, for example, a 
being which is omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good in all possible 
worlds. That such a being is possible, exists in some possible world, would 
then entail that that being exists in all possible worlds, including the actual 
world. (Alternatively, if such a being's non-existence is possible, if there is 
a possible world in which it does not exist, then that being does not exist in 
any possible world, including the actual world.) 
Like Kant, Valli cella focuses on the second stage of the CA, the move 
from necessary being to God (or, as he puts it, from the ens necessarium 
(EN) to the ens realissimum (ER)).3 The heart of his new dependency argu-
ment is his claim that 1) the CA "presupposes" that the ER is possible. 
Because of this, 2) the CA depends on the OA from possibility in a way 
which renders the CA superfluous. 
How does the CA presuppose the possibility of the ER? Vallicella 
explains the presupposition relation he has in mind as follows: 
To say that an argument presupposes a proposition is not to say that it 
features that proposition as an explicit premise, but that it has it as an 
implicit premise in the absence of which the argument would not be 
sound.4 
I take it that when Vallicella speaks of something "in the absence of which" 
the argument would not be sound he means something whose falsity 
would render the argument unsound. For he wants to say the CA presup-
poses "the ER is possible", and that proposition is presumably necessarily 
true if true at all. But if it is true, then it will not matter to the soundness of 
any argument whether that claim is or is not included as a premise - i.e., in 
a rather straightforward sense of "absent", it will not matter whether or not 
that premise is present or absent from the argument. If the argument was 
sound when it included that necessarily true premise it will remain sound 
without that premise - in either case the argument will have all true 
premises and it will be impossible for the premises to be true and the con-
clusion false. 
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So it is not unreasonable to read Vallicella as claiming that an argument 
presupposes a proposition A just in case that argument would not be 
sound were A false. This understanding is reinforced by the following 
passage in which Vallicella summarizes his position: 
... the problem for the second half of the CA is whether or not one 
can show that the EN is the ER. This is a question of identification, a 
question of specifying which being this necessary being is. But the 
attempt to identify the EN with the ER presupposes that the ER is 
possible ..... For something that has been proven to exist (the EN) 
cannot be identified with something that is impossible.s 
Here the CA presupposes that the ER is possible because if the ER were not 
possible the CA will not succeed in proving that the ER is actual. Once 
again the idea seems to be that an argument presupposes anything whose 
falsity would be incompatible with the argument's being sound. 
Given this understanding of an argument's presupposing a proposition, 
it is undeniable that the CA presupposes the proposition that the ER is pos-
sible. Now Vallicella claims that this shows that the CA "depends on" the 
OA. What does this mean? At the outset of his paper, Vallicella points to 
two senses in which one argument may depend on another. He distin-
guishes "soundness" dependence from what he calls "probativeness" 
dependence. To say the CA depends on the OA for its soundness is only to 
make the trivial claim that if the CA is sound then the OA is sound. 
Valli cella is concerned to make the stronger claim that the CA will be pro-
bative only if the OA is probative. He says, for example: 
... the CA presupposes that the ER is possible. But if so, then the CA 
depends on the OA for its probativeness.6 
To call an argument probative is to make a claim about the argument's "fit-
ness for producing genuine knowledge". Vallicella lists the following five 
necessary conditions for an argument's being probative (he leaves unde-
cided whether these conditions are jointly sufficient): 
... a deductive argument is probative only if it is (i) valid in point of 
logical form, has (ii) true premises that are (iii) known to be true, (iv) 
avoids petitio principii, and (v) is such that the premises are relevant to 
the conclusion.7 
Vallicella's claim that the CA depends on the OA then entails the claim that 
the CA will not satisfy these five conditions unless the OA does. In partic-
ular he is committed to claiming that the CA will not be probative, will not 
produce "genuine knowledge", unless the key premise in the OA (the very 
proposition presupposed by the CA), viz., the claim that the ER is possible, 
is not only true but known to be true. 
We might hear Vallicella's dependency claim in a relatively trivial way. 
If one completes the CA and thus comes to know that the ER actually 
exists, he then could at that point presumably deduce, and hence come to 
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know, that the ER is possible. And from there he could go on to produce a 
probative OA. In this sense a probative CA is sufficient for a probative 
OA, and hence the CA will be probative only if the OA is. Here, although 
there is probative dependency, the CA is indispensable; one still must rely 
on a successful CA in order to be in a position to produce a successful OA. 
But I will ignore this sort of case, for Vallicella is making the more interest-
ing claim that the CA depends for its probativeness on the OA in a way 
which renders the CA superfluous. On his view, the cosmological arguer 
could, as it were, stop in the middle of the second stage of his argument, 
focus on the presupposed proposition and generate a probative ontological 
argument from the claim that the ER is possible, not even bothering to fin-
ish his cosmological argument which, with its original appeal to experi-
ence, is not now (nor was it ever) needed. As he puts it: 
... if the CA cannot attain its ultimate goal without presupposing in 
its second half the real possibility of the ER, then one can simply 
begin with this possibility and "run" some such OA as ... [the one 
outlined just above] .... The recourse to experience would then be an 
unnecessary detour." 
Along the way to proving the existence of the ER, the CA presupposes a 
proposition which is itself sufficient to generate an ontological proof of the 
existence of the ER. The CA is thus superfluous because it cannot demon-
strate anything that couldn't just as well be demonstrated by the probative 
OA that sets out merely from the presupposed proposition. 
Suspicions might be aroused about V allicella' s argument if we employ 
the same sort of reasoning in other contexts. 
1. Suppose I wish to produce an argument for the existence of God 
based on religious or mystical experience. I might first argue that cer-
tain experiences must be agreed to have a supernatural cause. Having 
tried to establish that, I might go on to argue that that supernatural 
cause must be the ER (thinking of the ER in such a way that its possi-
bility entails its actuality). My argument could not be sound unless 
such a being were at least possible. But then, given Vallicella's 
approach, my argument presupposes that the ER is possible. And so, 
my argument then depends on the OA, and I could just start with that 
presupposed proposition and generate, via the OA, a proof of the ER. 
My argument from mystical experience would have been exposed as 
superfluous. (Indeed, any theistic proof, other than the OA, for a God 
whose possibility entails its actuality would be similarly superfluous.) 
2. Suppose you wish to produce an argument from evil for the non-exis-
tence of God (again conceiving of God in such a way that His possibili-
ty entails His actuality.) Then your argument will not be sound unless 
it is at least possible that God does not exist. Your argument thus pre-
supposes that God's non-existence is possible. But then you could start 
with that presupposed proposition and produce a probative ontologi-
cal argument for the non-existence of God. (If it is possible that such a 
God does not exist, then it is necessarily true that He does not.) Your 
argument from evil for atheism is rendered superfluous. 
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3. Andrew Wiles recently proved Fermat's Last Theorem (FL T). His 
argument cannot be sound unless it is at least possible that that theo-
rem is true. Therefore Wiles' argument presupposes that FLT is pos-
sibly true. But if it is possibly true, then it is necessarily true, and 
Wiles could have saved himself much labor by just starting with the 
presupposed proposition and generating a quick proof of the truth of 
FLT. His actual proof, the results of years of labor, would be super-
fluous because it would presuppose a proposition from which alone 
we could derive his conclusion. 
In each of these examples we have an initial argument for a conclusion C. 
The initial argument would not be sound unless a certain proposition P 
were true. So the initial argument presupposes P. It so happens that P 
itself entails the conclusion C of the initial argument. Thus P, if true, would 
serve as the first premise in a sound argument for C. And so it is claimed 
that the initial argument is superfluous, that one could just start with the 
presupposed proposition and argue directly for C from that. 
Surely something has gone wrong here. If we agree, in each case, 
that the initial argument presupposes a proposition P, we are only acknowl-
edging a point about logical relations. We are merely agreeing that the 
truth of P is a logically necessary condition for the soundness of the initial 
argument. But more is required if we are to judge the initial argument 
superfluous. As we pass through the initial argument we are hoping to 
come to know that (or attain some other epistemically favorable relation to, 
e.g., justiiiably believe that) its conclusion C is true. If this route to C is to be 
shown superfluous it needs to be shown that in order successfully to pass 
through the initial argument we will need to attain a certain epistemic rela-
tion to the presupposed proposition P which will allow us, starting with 
that proposition, to attain the same (or better) epistemically favorable rela-
tion to C that we were going to attain through the initial argument. 
But to say the initial argument presupposes a proposition P says noth-
ing about any epistemic relation the initial arguer is required to have 
towards P. Suppose the conclusion C of the initial argument entails a fur-
ther proposition D. Since C is sufficient for 0, 0 is necessary for C. Thus 
no argument for C will be sound unless 0 is true. Given the notion of pre-
supposition we are working with, this means that the initial argument pre-
supposes D. But the initial arguer may never have entertained D, let alone 
believed, justifiably believed, or known it. An argument can presuppose a 
proposition without the arguer having any particular epistemic relation 
towards the proposition presupposed. Thus the arguer may not have an 
epistemic relation toward the presupposed proposition strong enough to 
generate the favorable epistemic relation toward his conclusion C that his 
initial argument gives him. And this means, to use V allicella' s terminolo-
gy, that although the initial argument may presuppose P, no independent 
argument for C starting from P need be probative. In that case, the initial 
argument will not be superfluous; it may be the only way the arguer is able 
to come to know his conclusion C. 
The Wiles example brings out dramatically the gap between the logical 
point about presupposition and the epistemological requirement for super-
fluity. Of course Wiles' proof will not be sound unless FLT is possibly true. 
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And we can then say, if we like, that his proof presupposes that the theo-
rem is possibly true. But this has no epistemic consequences. In particular, 
it does not show Wiles' work is for nought. The presupposed proposition 
will, if true, be the first premise in a brief and sound argument for the truth 
of FLT. But we do not have a strong enough epistemic relation to it - and 
will not have until Wiles' proof is finished and seen to be successful - in 
order to use it to come to as strong an epistemic relation to FL T itself as we 
can come to via Wiles' proof. Everyone would agree that the argument, 
"FL T is possibly true; therefore, it is actually true", is valid and, if the 
premise is true, it is sound. But it is of course absurd to suppose that one 
might, pre-Wiles, come to know" that FLT is true by passing through this 
short argument from possibility. No pre-Wiles argument starting with the 
presupposed proposition will be probative. Surely this is because no one -
prior to working through Wiles' longer proof - knows or even has good 
reason for believing that FLT is even possibly true. These desirable epis-
temic relations toward the possibility premise come - and come trivially -
only after availing ourselves of Wiles' indispensable work. 
There are lessons here for the case of the CA and the OA. Because of the 
way we are conceiving the ER, such a being is actual just in case it is possi-
ble. So the CA (indeed, as we have seen, any proof of the actuality of the 
ER) presupposes that the ER is possible.lUBut this has no relevant epistemic 
implications. The presupposed proposition, if true, can serve as the first 
premise in a brief and sound argument for the same conclusion we arrive 
at through the CA. But we need not have any particular epistemic relation 
to the presupposed proposition. l1 In particular we may not have as favor-
able an epistemic relation to it as we have to the proposition 'the EN 
exists', that starting point of the second half of the CA which leads the cos-
mological arguer to the conclusion that the ER actually exists. In that case 
the CA will not be superfluous. One may come to know in the first part of 
that argument that the EN exists and then - from that, and only from that-
arrive at the conclusion that the ER exists. 
My argument here can be summarized as follows. To show that the CA 
is theoretically superfluous one must show that for one to go through the 
CA - and come to know via that route that the ER exists - requires attain-
ing, prior to the end of the argument, a favorable epistemic relation 
towards the claim that the ER is possible, a relation which is sufficient for 
coming to know, via the OA, that the ER is actual. But, given what 
Vallicella appears to mean by "presuppose", then even if an argument A 
for a conclusion C presupposes a proposition P, one could use A to attain a 
favorable epistemic relation to C without having - prior to reaching the 
conclusion C - any particular epistemic relation to P, let alone an epistemic 
relation which will allow one to attain the same (or better) epistemic rela-
tion toward C that (than) A itself provides. Thus, even if the CA presup-
poses the possibility of the ER, it does not follow that the CA depends on 
the OA in any way which renders the CA superfluous. 
To make his case, Vallicella needs a more epistemic notion of presuppo-
sition. The required notion must do two things. It must allow him plausibly 
to claim that the CA presupposes that the ER is possible. And it must allow 
him an inference from that to his claim about the probative dependence of 
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the CA on the OA. The notion Vallicella actually seems to employ is ade-
quate to the first task, but not to the second. But I suspect that a revised 
notion, adequate to the second task, will fail at the first. For the general con-
siderations advanced above to question the inference from presupposition 
to dependence will almost certainly now be available to question any more 
epistemically flavored initial claim of presupposition itself.12 13 
University of California, Santa Barbara 
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7. op. cit., p. 442. 
8. op. cit., p. 449. 
9. For simplicity, let us suppose that the desired epistemic relation in 
these examples is knowledge. 
10. Similarly, any attempted proof that the ER is possible will "presup-
pose" that the ER is actual. 
11. Discussions of versions of the modal ontological argument from possi-
bility have revealed how difficult it is to establish, or even provide good 
grounds for, its possibility premise. My own view is that if we think of God in 
such a way that His possibility entails His actuality, then (a) 'God (or the ER) is 
possible' is a necessary, but a posteriori, proposition; and (b) we can attain a 
favorable epistemic relation to that proposition only be first attaining that 
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development of this view see my "The Modal Ontological Argument and the 
Necessary A Posteriori", International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 29 (1991), 
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12. For example, one might define presupposition in such a way that an 
argument A for conclusion C presupposes a proposition P if one must invoke the 
knowledge that P is true in order to use A to arrive at knowledge of C. This will 
make it easier to make Vallicella's inference from his claim of presupposition to 
his claim of dependency. But it will at the same time make it much more difficult 
to make the case that the CA really does presuppose that the ER is possible. 
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